A petition for writ of certiorari has been filed seeking to
overturn the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Crawford
v. LVNV Funding, LLC. The petition,
if granted, may have wider implications than simply determining whether filing
a proof of claim on time barred debt violates the FDCPA. In Crawford, the
debtor commenced an adversary proceeding against a debt buyer, alleging that
the filing of a time barred proof of claim violated the automatic stay and the
FDCPA. The debt buyer ultimately withdrew the proof of claim; however,
the adversary proceeding proceeded forward. The Bankruptcy Court granted
LVNV’s motion to dismiss holding that the filing of a proof of claim, even one
on time barred debt, did not constitute a violation of the FDCPA. The
district court affirmed. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
the filing of a proof of claim was an attempt to collect a debt and that the
filing of a proof of claim for time barred debt violated the FDCPA. In so
holding, the court seemed to take issue with the fact that an otherwise
uncollectible debt would result in some recovery under the Chapter 13 plan.
“Such a distribution of funds to debt collectors with time-barred claims then
necessarily reduces the payments to other legitimate creditors with enforceable
claims.” Crawford,
758 F.3d at 1261. Additionally, the court premised its reversal on
the notion that “a debt collector’s filing of a time-barred proof of claim
creates the misleading impression to the debtor that the debt collector can
legally enforce the debt.” Id.
Moreover, the court applied the least sophisticated consumer standard
even though Crawford was represented by counsel.
The well written
petition calls the court’s attention to the numerous problems presented by the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Crawford:
1.
It is inconsistent with the uniform prior case
law which held that a proof of claim in bankruptcy cannot serve as the basis
for an FDCPA claim. The petition points
to the fact that the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is in direct conflict with the three
other circuits that have reviewed this issue.
2.
Crawford created a further divide amongst the circuits as to whether FDCPA
liability can be premised upon actions in bankruptcy. The petition points to the Supreme Court’s
prior decision in Kokoszka v. Belford, in which the Supreme Court
established the interpretative framework for assessing the scope of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act (out of which the FDCPA was passed as an
amendment to the CCPA) in the context of a bankruptcy. “In enacting the CCPA, the Court concluded,
there was “no indication” that “Congress intended drastically to alter the
delicate balance of a debtor’s protections and obligations during the
bankruptcy procedure.”” The petition,
while noting the current split in decisions amongst the circuits as to Kokoszka’s
application, underscores the need for clarity from the Supreme Court. The
petition goes to great lengths to point out that the Eleventh Circuit’s
extension of the FDCPA into the bankruptcy context is inconsistent with the
stated purpose and text of the FDCPA. The petition points out that the filing
of a proof of claim cannot be debt collection regulated by the FDCPA because the
FDCPA applies only to attempts to collect an obligation from a natural
person. Proofs of claim, on the
other hand, are vehicles for making claims against the bankruptcy estate,
which is a separate and distinct entity from the debtor.
3.
Bringing
even wider implications, the petition seeks a ruling on the standard for
evaluating communications to attorneys under the FDCPA. The petition points to the Eleventh Circuit’s
holding that a least sophisticated consumer standard governs FDCPA claims
arising from the filing of a proof of claim in bankruptcy. The petition points to the fact that the
circuits are widely split as to the proper standard to be applied to communications
to attorneys under the FDCPA.
4. The petition further points to the practical
problems presented by the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. Included among the many pointed out by the petition,
if proofs of claim are by their very nature debt collection activities, then
the very filing of a proof of claim violates the automatic stay. Additionally, if the filing of a proof of
claim is debt collection, then all the other provisions of the FDCPA must also
apply, including the notice and debt validation procedures of the FDCPA.
The petition is
well worth the read and can be found here: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/lvnv-funding-llc-v-crawford/. Amicus briefs have been filed by at least
three other interested organizations.
The consumer’s response brief is due March 23, 2015.
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