Showing posts with label foreclosure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreclosure. Show all posts

Friday, March 15, 2019

Bankruptcy Disclaimer Did Not Violate FDCPA


A district court in Michigan recently dismissed an FDCPA action, holding that a letter which included a bankruptcy disclaimer was for informational purposes only and did not violate the FDCPA.  Tyler v. Fabrizio & Brook, P.C., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33450 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2019).  At first glance, the decision appears to be in conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s prior decisions in Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2013) and Scott v. Trott Law, P.C., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 1015 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2019).  In those cases, the Sixth Circuit concluded that foreclosure proceedings are debt collection.

The case centers around a single letter and a bankruptcy disclaimer.  In 2015, Tyler’s mortgage debt was discharged in bankruptcy.  In 2016, the bank engaged the defendant law firm to foreclose on the underlying real property.  The law firm then sent Ms. Tyler the following letter:

Dear Borrower(s),

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., successor by merger to LaSalle Bank Midwest, N.A. fka Standard Federal Bank has retained our law firm to begin foreclosure proceedings on the above referenced property. As of the date of this letter, you owe $27,036.78. Because of interest, late charges and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due [*8]  on the day you pay may be greater, and an adjustment may be necessary after our client receives your payment.

Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of the debt or some portion of it, this office will assume that the debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing within 30 days of receiving this notice, this office will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment and mail a copy of it to you. If you request in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor if different from the current creditor.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

Devara Walton

Real Estate Default Team

FABRIZIO & BROOK, P.C.

FABRIZIO & BROOK, P.C. IS THE CREDITOR'S ATTORNEY AND IS ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT A DEBT ON ITS BEHALF. ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE. HOWEVER. IF YOU ARE IN BANKRUPTCY OR HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY, THIS LETTER IS FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY AND IS NOT INTENDED AS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECTA DEBT OR AS AN ACT TO COLLECT, ASSESS, OR RECOVER ALL OR ANY PORTION OF THE DEBT FROM YOU PERSONALLY

Tyler at *7-9.

Tyler sued the law firm, claiming the letter violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e and asserted that the language “you owe $27,036.78” was misleading since the debt had been discharged in her bankruptcy. The law firm moved to dismiss, alleging that the letter was not an attempt to collect a debt, but instead for informational purposes only.

The court determined that the letter’s primary purpose was informational and to notify Tyler that foreclosure proceedings were about to start.  The court noted that the letter did not explicitly ask for payment, did not provide a due date for payment, did not provide a payment coupon and did not provide an address to mail payment.  Moreover, the court noted the letter contained a bankruptcy disclaimer which was on the same page as the remainder of the letter and “arguably the most conspicuous thing on the letter.”  Id. at *6.

The court’s decision is difficult to reconcile with its Circuit’s recent holding in Scott v. Trott Law, P.C.  in which the Sixth Circuit confirmed its view that foreclosure proceedings are debt collection.  The district court attempted to reconcile its decision by noting that the letter was not a required step in the foreclosure or actual foreclosure activity.  Instead, the court noted that “the letter was a courtesy to Tyler letting her know that foreclosure proceedings were about to start.  Its primary purpose to inform.” Id. at *5. 

Foreclosure law firms should continue to monitor developments in this area closely.  A split in the circuits as to whether non-judicial foreclosure constitutes debt collection may be resolved shortly by the Supreme Court.  Oral arguments were heard in January regarding this issue and a decision is expected this Spring.

Monday, February 18, 2019

Sixth Circuit Doubles Down Despite Impending U.S. Supreme Court Decision


By Caren Enloe and Anna Claire Turpin



Just four days after the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP regarding whether non-judicial foreclosures qualify as debt collection under the FDCPA, the Sixth Circuit doubled down on its position that non-judicial foreclosures are debt collection.  Building on its 2013 decision in Glazer v. Chase Home Finance LLC., 704 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2013), which joined the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in holding that non-judicial foreclosures are “debt collection” under the FDCPA, the Sixth Circuit held on January 11 that a law firm has an affirmative duty to “stop the clock” on an initiated foreclosure once it receives a §1692g(b) dispute from the debtor.



In Scott v. Trott Law, P.C., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 1015* (6th Cir., Jan. 11, 2019), the consumer alleged that Trott Law violated the FDCPA by failing to cease debt collection activities after receiving his dispute and request for validation.  After being retained by Bank of America to begin non-judicial foreclosure proceedings, the law firm sent the consumer a debt validation letter. The law firm then proceeded forward with arranging a sheriff’s sale for Foreclosure of Mortgage by Advertisement, preparing a Notice of Mortgage Foreclosure Sale to post on the premises and to publish in the local newspaper for four consecutive weeks, and mailing a copy of the Notice to the consumer. Three days after the law firm initiated these actions, and still within the thirty day debt dispute and validation period, the consumer disputed the debt and requested validation of the debt.  Although the law firm took no further affirmative actions, the notice was posted on the premises and published in the newspaper after the law firm received the dispute and debt validation request. Within days of sending his dispute and request for validation, the consumer then filed its suit against the law firm alleging a violation of the FDCPA and seeking to enjoin the impending sale and then filed Chapter 13 thereby stopping the sale.



The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the law firm based on its determination that the debt collector was not required to validate the debt and had ceased collection of the debt because third-parties, not the debt collector, posted and published the Notice.  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the actions taken after the consumer’s dispute and request for validation qualified as debt collection activity, and whether the FDCPA required Trott to take affirmative action to “stop the clock.”



The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because the FDCPA does not provide a precise definition of "debt collection" or what it means to cease debt collection, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the relationship between Michigan law on non-judicial foreclosures, debt collection under the FDCPA, and Congress’ intent and policy behind the requirement that a debt collector cease collection when it receives a dispute letter. 15 U.S.C. §1692g(b). Because Michigan law requires notice and publication before a non-judicial foreclosure, the Court concluded that such activities are continued debt collection activity under the FDCPA.  The Court then reasoned that those activities remain the debt collector’s responsibility.  Otherwise, according to the Court, dispute letters would not achieve Congress’ intended effect of “ceasing debt collection” if debt collection activities may continue solely because they are not performed by the debt collector.



The Court held that instead, a debt collector is responsible for the activities it sets in motion as required by state law in the non-judicial foreclosure process.  The debt collector must “stop the clock” on all debt collection activities until the debt collector obtains verification. Scott at *13.  Because the sale, posting, and publication (performed by the sheriff and newspaper, respectively) were required under state law in the non-judicial foreclosure process, those actions constituted debt collection and the law firm was responsible for intervening and stopping the entire process.



It is important to note that after hearing oral arguments in Obduskey, the Supreme Court may render the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision moot.  Should the Supreme Court hold that non-judicial foreclosure is not debt collection, then Scott will have been wrongly decided.  Until the Supreme Court weighs in, however, the circuit split continues.



Anna Claire Turpin is a third year law student at Campbell University and a graduate of James Madison University.  Turpin is currently a law clerk with Smith Debnam’s Consumer Financial Services Litigation and Compliance group.

Thursday, February 1, 2018

Tenth Circuit Joins the Fray Regarding Whether Foreclosures Are Debt Collection Activity


The Tenth Circuit has weighed in on whether a non-judicial foreclosure is debt collection activity.  In doing so, the Tenth Circuit has joined a split in the circuits on the issue.  With the Tenth Circuit’s decision the circuits remain split with the Ninth Circuit and now the Tenth Circuit holding that non-judicial foreclosures are not debt collection activity and the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits holding that they are.

  In Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 1275 (10th Cir., Jan. 19, 2018), Wells Fargo retained foreclosure counsel who sent the consumer an initial communication which stated that it “MAY BE CONSIDERED A DEBT COLLECTOR ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT A DEBT” and advised Mr. Obduskey that it had been retained to initiate foreclosure proceedings.  The letter referenced the amount owed and identified the current creditor as Wells Fargo.  In response, the consumer requested validation of the debt.  Instead of responding, the law firm initiated a non-judicial foreclosure.  Mr. Obduskey then filed suit alleging the law firm violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g. 

The law firm moved to dismiss the action asserting that it was not a debt collector covered by the FDCPA because a foreclosure proceeding is not a debt collection activity.  The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint.  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the FDCPA applies to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.  

In doing so, the court first looked to the plain language of the statute and the nature of a non-judicial foreclosure.  Adopting the rationale of the Ninth Circuit, the court took the position that the FDCPA only imposes liability when an entity is attempting to collect money.  Because a non-judicial foreclosure does not preserve the right to collect a deficiency personally against the mortgagor and would require a separate action to do so, the Court was persuaded that it was not an attempt to collect money and was only the enforcement of a security interest. 

The Court also found that policy considerations supported its decision. The Court took into consideration the provisions of Colorado’s non-judicial foreclosure statutes and noted that they conflicted with the FDCPA.  Specifically, the state provisions required notice to any party that may have acquired an interest in the property.  The state statute therefore conflicted with the third party prohibitions under the FDCPA.  The state provisions also conflicted with the FDCPA by requiring direct notice to the consumer even when represented by counsel. Taking this into account, the court found that there is no ‘clear and manifest’ intention on the part of Congress to supplant state non-judicial foreclosure law. Indeed, many of the conflicts noted above are designed to protect the consumer and preempting them under the FDCPA would seem to undermine their purpose as well as the purpose of the FDCPA.”  Obduskey at *11-12 (internal citations omitted).

It is important to note that the Court’s decision is limited in several respects.  First, it is limited to non-foreclosure proceedings.  Secondly, the holding is limited to the facts of this case.  The court suggested that its holding might have been different had there been evidence of “aggressive collection efforts leveraging the threat of foreclosure into payment of money.” Id. at *12.  The court left that discussion for another day as there were no facts to suggest the law firm had demanded payment or used foreclosure as a threat to elicit payment.