In an FCRA action, where the
consumer disputed that a collection agency had a permissible purpose to access
his credit report, the District Court of New Hampshire has held that to
establish permissible purpose, the collection agency must establish that it was
seeking to collect an “account” as the term is narrowly defined in 15 U.S.C.
§1693a(2). In Bersaw v. Northland Group, Inc., C.A No. 14-cv-128-JL, a debt buyer
assigned to Northland Group for collection two accounts owed by Bersaw. In its collection efforts, Northland Group
accessed the consumer credit report of Bersaw.
Bersaw filed suit alleging that Northland Group did not have a
permissible purpose to access his credit report because he had not had any
business dealings or accounts with Northland and had not applied for credit or
employment with Bersaw. Northland Group
filed for summary judgment, arguing that the FCRA expressly permits an entity
to obtain a credit report when collecting a debt from the consumer.
In denying Northland’s motion for
summary judgment, the court looked at the specific language of 15 U.S.C. §1681b(3)(A)
which provides that a consumer reporting agency may furnish a credit report to
a person who intends to use the information for a permissible purpose and
specifically, in this case, “in
connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the
information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or
review or collection of an account
of, the consumer.” (emphasis
supplied). The court determined that it
was not enough to be simply attempting to collect a debt from the consumer –
the collection agency must be attempting to collect an account from the consumer, as the term is defined in 15 U.S.C.
§1693a(2). Under 15 U.S.C. §1693a(2),
the term account is defined as being a “demand deposit, savings deposit, or
other asset account (other than an occasional or incidental credit balance in
an open end credit plan as defined in section 1602(i) of this title), as described in regulations of the
Bureau, established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” The court determined that Northland had not brought
forth any evidence whatsoever “that sheds any light on the nature of the debts
Northland was attempting to collect from Bersaw. They may have been “demand deposit, savings
deposit or other asset account[s]” and they may well have been incurred “primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes. But, based upon the information
presently before the court, it is equally possible that the debts in question
were not such accounts, and were incurred for business (or some other)
purposes.” The court therefore denied
Northland's motion for summary judgment.
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