The Fourth Circuit recently examined the issue of Article
III standing in the context of the FDCPA.
In Ben-Davies v. Blibaum &
Associates, P.A., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9667 (4th Cir. June 1,
2017), the consumer sought to assert an FDCPA claim against a law firm,
contending that the law firm attempted to collect a debt arising out of a state
court judgment by demanding payment of an incorrect sum based on the
calculation of an interest rate not authorized by law. The consumer alleged that as a “direct
consequence” she “suffered and continues to suffer” “emotional distress, anger
and frustration.” Id. at *6. The district
court dismissed the FDCPA claim for lack of standing under Article IIII,
concluding that Ben-Davies had not established an injury in fact.
In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit reversed. In examining the “injury in fact” component
of standing, the court noted that “injury in fact” is not limited to financial
or economic losses but can be shown when the plaintiff shows that she suffered
an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized
and actual or imminent. In this case,
the court was influenced by the fact that “[t]his was not a case where the
plaintiff simply alleged a bare procedural violation [of the FDCPA], divorced
from any concrete harm.” Id. Instead, the court took the position that the
allegations of actual existing harms that affected here personally and
specifically, the allegations of “emotional distress, anger and frustration:
were sufficient to establish the existence of injury in fact.
A point of concern for the ARM industry is the fact that the
court did not limit its review of the matters to the pleading (the motion
before the court was a motion based upon Rule 12(b)(1)) but instead included “documents
explicitly incorporated into the complaint” as well as additional documents
submitted by Ben-Davies which “do not conflict with the allegations and that
are integral to the complaint and authentic.”
Id. at *3-4.
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