A recent district court opinion from Michigan makes clear
that statutory violations of the FDCPA do not absolve a plaintiff from the need
to show a concrete injury in order to establish Article III standing. In Johnston
v. Midland Credit Mgmt, C.A. No. 1:16-cv-437, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10610
(Jan. 26, 2017), the complaint alleged that
the consumer received a settlement letter which provided three settlement
options. The letter contained an error
in that the second settlement option was not populated with a payment
amount. Instead, it indicated a blank
discount percentage rate and a monthly payment amount of $0.00 due on March 25,
2016. The consumer, on the advice of counsel, contacted Midland and indicated
that he would take the zero-dollar option.
When Midland advised him the letter contained an error but that the
first settlement offer of a lump sum was still available, the consumer rejected
the offer and stated that he only wanted the zero-dollar payment option. Based upon the letter and Midland’s failure
to honor the zero-dollar option, the plaintiff filed suit asserting that the
settlement letter was false, misleading and/or deceptive under 15 U.S.C.
1692e. Midland moved to dismiss
asserting that the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury and that the
mistaken language of the letter did not change the fact that the plaintiff owed
the full amount of the debt at issue.
The court granted the motion to dismiss. In doing so, the court considered first,
whether there was a concrete injury sufficient to support jurisdiction and
secondly whether the plaintiff had stated a plausible claim under Rule
12(b)(6). Regarding the first inquiry,
the court determined that no concrete injury in fact had been pled. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument
that he suffered actual damages because he was not able “to put the subject
debt behind him for $0.00 and that other collection attempts in the future may
occur”. The court noted that the
letter’s statement did not change the fact that the plaintiff owed the
debt. Moreover, the court was equally
dismissive of the notion that Plaintiff incurred harm because “his receipt of
the false, deceptive and misleading collection letter caused him to keep the
letter and seek advice of counsel, thus incurring de minimis travel expenses, loss of time to evaluate the letter and
call Midland to determine the validity of the offer, as opposed to ignoring it
and throwing it in the trash.”
Moreover, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not
sufficiently stated a plausible claim under the FDCPA under the least
sophisticated consumer standard. The
court pointed out that while the “standard recognizes the Act protects the gullible
and the shrewd alike while simultaneously presuming a basic level of
reasonableness and understanding on the part of the debtor.” In reviewing the language at issue, the court
observed that
Reviewing the letter in its entirety, the least sophisticated
consumer would realize that the $0.00 payment option was an error. First, the second option listed “OFF,”
whereas the first option listed “90% OFF.”
Further, the second option indicated a first payment date of March 25, 2016. This not only shows an amount
was due, but that it could be made over multiple payments which does not make
sense if nothing was due. Finally, the
least sophisticated consumer would understand that giving nothing in exchange
for the satisfaction of a debt is not a payment.”
Johnston at *14-15. The
decision is a positive for the debt collection industry and is reflective of
the positive effects of Spokeo and
the further scrutiny being placed on consumer protection complaints by courts
nationwide to insure there is in fact a justiciable issue for determination.
No comments:
Post a Comment