The Sixth Circuit has clarified
what constitutes “prior express consent” in connection with debt collection. In Hill
v. Homeward Residential, Inc., File
No. 15a0201p.06, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14703 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 2015)
the consumer sued its mortgage company under the TCPA for calls made to his
cell phone. The question presented to
the court was whether Hill provided Homeward Residential with prior express
consent. The debt at issue was
originated by another mortgage company and in connection with obtaining the
mortgage, Hill provided a home number and a work number. Ultimately, the home line was cancelled and
the mortgage was transferred to Homeward Residential. Over the course of his dealings with Homeward
Residential, Hill provided his cell number on a number of occasions, including:
(1) by notifying Homeward Residential that his primary phone number had changed
and providing his cell number; (2) by listing his cell number on the loan
modification documents; and (3) by listing his cell number on a number of loss
mitigation documents.
The court determined that Hill
provided prior express consent. The
court additionally endorsed the FCC’s clarification of prior express consent in
the debt context and the trial court’s jury instruction on the same which read
as follows:
“’Prior express consent’ means that before
Defendant made a call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, Plaintiff had
given an invitation or permission receive calls to that number.
Autodialed and prerecorded message calls
to wireless numbers that are provided by the called party to a creditor in
connection with an existing debt are permissible as calls made with the ‘prior
express consent’ of the called party.”
In doing so,
the court noted consent does not have to be given at the outset of the
transaction, but can be provided during the transaction. Therefore, any “autodialed and prerecorded
message calls to wireless numbers provided
by the called party in connection with an existing debt are made with the ‘prior
express consent’ of the called party.” Slip
Op. at 7 (internal citations omitted).
Importantly, the court also held that the debtor does not have to give
his consent to automated calls specifically and general consent to being called
on the cell phone will suffice.