Courts continuing to deal with Crawford copycat claims are bringing a
sharper focus to the issue and looking closely at the conflict presented by the
FDCPA and Bankruptcy Code. Three courts
who have recently reviewed Crawford claims have dismissed them, concluding in
all three cases that the filing of an otherwise accurate time barred proof of
claim does not give rise to an FDCPA claim.
Recapping Crawford v. LVNV Funding LLC. In Crawford, the debtor filed an
adversary proceeding against several debt buyers, alleging that the filing of a
time barred proof of claim violated the automatic stay and the FDCPA. The
adversary proceeding was commenced almost four years after the
suspect proof of claim was filed. The debt buyer ultimately withdrew
the proof of claim; however, the adversary proceeding proceeded forward.
The Bankruptcy Court granted the debt buyers’ motion to dismiss holding that
the filing of a proof of claim, even one on time barred debt, did not
constitute a violation of the FDCPA. The district court agreed and affirmed
the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
the filing of a proof of claim was an attempt to collect a debt and that the
filing of a proof of claim for time barred debt violated the FDCPA. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC,
758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
In so holding, the court took issue with the
fact that an otherwise uncollectible debt would result in some recovery under
the Chapter 13 plan. “Such a distribution of funds to debt collectors with
time-barred claims then necessarily reduces the payments to other legitimate
creditors with enforceable claims.” Crawford, 758 F.3d at
1261. Additionally, the court premised its reversal on the notion
that “a debt collector’s filing of a time-barred proof of claim creates the
misleading impression to the debtor that the debt collector can legally enforce
the debt.” Id. In April of this year, the Supreme Court refused to
grant review of the decision. More recently, the bankruptcy court
dismissed the adversary proceeding on remand because the debt failed to file
its adversary proceeding within the applicable statute of limitations. Crawford
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, Case No. 08-30192-DHW, Adv. Pro. No. 12-030333-DHW
(Sep. 29, 2015).
Left unaddressed by the Crawford parties was whether the
Bankruptcy Code’s claim procedures precluded an FDCPA violation. In a footnote
which ultimately has had more value than the actual opinion, the Eleventh
Circuit declined “to weigh in on a topic the district court artfully dodged whether
the Code “preempts” the FDCPA when creditors misbehave in bankruptcy.” Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1262, n.7. The Crawford
decision, therefore, has limited precedential value because the court specifically
declined to consider whether the Bankruptcy Code precludes the FDCPA in the
bankruptcy context.
Defendants in the copycat cases
spawned by Crawford have taken note
and raised preemption as a defense in the overwhelming majority of the cases brought since then. Three recent opinions
reflect the sharper focus being placed on this issue. The issues, as couched by
these cases, are twofold: (a) whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts the FDCPA;
and (b) whether the Bankruptcy Code’s claim filing, allowance and objection
procedures preclude damages under the FDCPA for time barred proofs of claim. Jenkins
v. Midland Credit Management, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3143, *5, 538 B.R. 129, (N.D. Ala. Sept. 17, 2015); see also Martin v. Quantum3 Grp., (N.D.
Miss. Oct. 9, 2015); Martel v. LVNV
Funding, LLC, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3465 (D. Maine Oct. 13, 2015).
In addressing the issue of wholesale
preclusion, each court declined to hold that the Bankruptcy Code preempts
the FDCPA. By the same token, each court
concluded that the filing of an otherwise accurate, but time barred proof of
claim does not give rise to an FDCPA claim. In reaching their conclusion, all
three courts agreed that the issue is more nuanced than a wholesale preemption
and instead chose to focus on the more narrow issue.
Interestingly, the courts came to
the conclusion differently. In so holding,
the Martin court noted the narrowness
of its decision acknowledging that while it may be possible for the FDCPA to
apply within a bankruptcy case, and perhaps to the filing of a proof of claim,
it does not prohibit the filing of accurate but time barred claims. Id.
at *14. The court gave deference to the
Bankruptcy claims procedures by noting that the claims procedures were adopted
after the FDCPA and where two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the latter
act (the Bankruptcy Code) to the extent of a conflict impliedly repeals the earlier Act (the FDCPA). Id.
at *16. Similarly, the Jenkins court concluded that the notion
that the FDCPA prohibits, and therefore penalizes, a debt collector for attempting
to collect a time barred debt by filing a proof of claim simply loses traction
when considered in light of the claims -filing, objection, allowance, and
disallowance procedures prescribed in Code §§501 and 502 and Rules 3001-3008… [and]
the Code’s broad definition of “claim” in §101(5)(A).” Jenkins
at *6. In also concluding the statutes
were not irreconcilably in conflict, the Martel
court noted that the FDCPA does
not prohibit all debt collection practices – just those that are false,
misleading, deceptive, unfair or unconscionable. The court concluded that the filing of an
accurate but time barred proof of claim therefore did not violate the FDCPA.
As courts continue to address
these copycat claims, it is becoming abundantly clear that the preemption issue
will be viewed narrowly. The vast
majority of courts addressing the issue to date have concluded that the filing
of an accurate but time barred proof of claim does not give rise to a viable
FDCPA claim.